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Abstract
In standard political economy models, voters are ￿ self-interested￿i.e. care only
about ￿ own￿ utility. However, the emerging evidence indicates that voters often
have ￿ other-regarding preferences￿(ORP), i.e., in deciding among alternative policies
voters care about their payo⁄s relative to others. We extend a widely used general
equilibrium framework in political economy to allow for voters with ORP, as in Fehr-
Schmidt (1999). In line with the evidence, these preferences allow voters to exhibit
￿ envy￿ and ￿ altruism￿ , in addition to the standard concern for ￿ own utility￿ . We
give su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have
ORP. This could open the way for an incorporation of ORP in a variety of political
economy models. Furthermore, as a corollary, we give more general conditions for
the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have purely sel￿sh preferences.
Keywords: Redistribution, other regarding preferences, single crossing property.
JEL Classi￿cation: D64; D72; D78 .
￿We are grateful to helpful comments from participants at the Public Economics Weekend at the
University of Leicester, June 2007. In particular we would like to thank Ian Preston and Hamish Low.
yDepartment of Economics, University of Leicester, University Road, Leicester. LE1 7RH, UK. Phone:
+44-116-2522086. Fax: +44-116-2522908. E-mail: Sanjit.Dhami@le.ac.uk.
zDepartment of Economics, University of Leicester, University Road, Leicester. LE1 7RH, UK. Phone:
+44-116-2522898. Fax: +44-116-2522908. E-mail: aa10@le.ac.uk.1. Introduction
The median voter theorem has been seminal to the development of modern political econ-
omy. The standard model relies on voters being self-interested. The main expository
framework for this work relies on Romer (1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richard
(1981) (or the RRMR framework) which is a simple general equilibrium model with en-
dogenous labor supply.
Despite the standard assumption of self-interested voters, it seems very plausible that
explanations for redistribution should be underpinned by the inherent human desire to
care directly for the well being of others. In other words, in the domain of redistribu-
tion, it seems reasonable to postulate that individuals have other regarding preferences
(or ORP for short). An emerging empirical literature is strongly supportive of the role of
ORP speci￿cally in the domain of voting models; see, for instance, Ackert et al. (2007),
Bolton and Ockenfels (2006) and Tyran and Sausgruber (2006). These papers establish
that voters often choose policies that promote equity/fairness over purely sel￿sh consider-
ations. Bolton and Ockenfels (2006), for instance, examine the preference for equity versus
e¢ ciency in a voting game. Groups of three subjects are formed and are presented with
two alternative policies: one that promotes equity while the other promotes e¢ ciency. The
￿nal outcome is chosen by a majority vote. About twice as many experimental subjects
preferred equity as compared to e¢ ciency. Furthermore, even those willing to change the
status-quo for e¢ ciency are willing to pay, on average, less than half relative to those who
wish to alter the status-quo for equity.
An important question is the following. Does a Condorcet winner exist in a model
with ORP? The lack of a satisfactory answer is likely to hold up progress within the
class of political economy models that seek to incorporate the important insights from the
literature on ORP. The current situation is analogous to the period of time before the
median voter theorem was discovered by Duncan Black (1948) (and later popularized by
Anthony Downs, 1957) for the case of self-interested voters. However, once known, and
popularized, the median voter theorem opened up the domain of modern political economy
as we know it today. The aim of our paper is to provide su¢ cient conditions under which
a Condorcet winner exists when voters have ORP in a RRMR framework.
There are several models of fairness in the literature. We choose to use the Fehr-
Schmidt (1999) (henceforth, FS) approach to fairness1. In this approach, voters care,
1Bolton and Ockenfels (2002) provide yet another approach of inequity averse economic agents (referred
to as ￿ ERC￿ , short for equity, reciprocity and cooperation), but it cannot explain the outcome of the public
good game with punishment, which is a fairly robust experimental ￿nding. Charness and Rabin (2002)
provide two successive versions of their model. In the ￿rst version, economic agents do not care directly
about outcome di⁄erences or the role of ￿ intentions￿ . This model is unable to explain the results of
the public good game with punishment. A second version of the model introduces the role of intentions.
1not only about their own payo⁄s, but also about their payo⁄s relative to those of others.
If their payo⁄ is greater than other voters then they su⁄er from advantageous-inequity
(arising from, say, altruism) and if their payo⁄ is lower than other voters they su⁄er from
disadvantageous-inequity (arising from, say, envy). Several reasons motivate our choice of
the FS model.
1. The FS model is tractable and explains the experimental results arising from several
games where the prediction of the standard game theory model with sel￿sh agents
yields results that are not consistent with the experimental evidence. These games
include the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, the dictator game as well as
the public-good game with punishment2.
2. The FS model focusses on the role of inequity aversion. However, a possible objection
is that it ignores the role played by ￿ intentions￿that have been shown to be important
in experimental results (Falk et al. (2002)) and treated explicitly in theoretical work
(Rabin (1993), Falk and Fischbacher (2006)). However, experimental results on the
importance of intentions come largely from bilateral interactions. Economy-wide
voting, on the other hand, is impersonal and anonymous, thereby making it unlikely
that intentions play any important role in this phenomenon.
3. Experimental results on voting lend support to the use of the FS model in such
contexts. Tyran and Sausgruber (2006) explicitly test for the importance of the FS
framework in the context of direct voting. They conclude that the FS model pre-
dicts much better than the standard sel￿sh-voter model. In addition, the FS model
provides, in their words, ￿strikingly accurate predictions for individual voting in all
three income classes.￿The econometric results of Ackert et al. (2007), based on their
experimental data, lend further support to the FS model in the context of redistrib-
utive taxation. The estimated coe¢ cients of altruism and envy in the FS model
are statistically signi￿cant and, as expected, negative in sign. Social preferences
are found to in￿ uence participant￿ s vote over alternative taxes. They ￿nd evidence
that some participants are willing to reduce their own payo⁄s in order to support
However, voting is anonymous and involves very large numbers of voters, hence, intentions, in all possibility
have a minor, if any, role to play. For a survey of theoretical models of ORP, its neuroeconomic foundations,
and the empirical results, see Fehr and Fischbacher (2002).
2In the ￿rst three of these games, experimental subjects o⁄er more to the other party relative to the
predictions of the Nash outcome with sel￿sh preferences. In the public good game with punishment,
the possibility of ex-post punishment dramatically reduces the extent of free riding in voluntary giving
towards a public good. In the standard theory with sel￿sh agents, bygones are bygones, so there is no
ex-post incentive for the contributors to punish the free-riders. Foreseeing this outcome, free riders are
not deterred, which is in disagreement with the evidence. Such behavior can be easily explained within
the FS framework.
2taxes that reduce advantageous or disadvantageous inequity. In the context of vot-
ing experiments, Bolton and Ockenfels (2006) conclude that ￿...while not everyone
measures fairness the same way, the simple measures o⁄ered by ERC or FS provide
a pretty good approximation to population behavior over a wide range of scenarios
that economists care about.￿
It is worth noting that when the labor supply decision is endogenous, the median-voter
theorem with sel￿sh voters is known to hold only in special cases. Actual (and successful)
applications largely use quasi-linear preferences with quadratic-disutility of labour e⁄ort.
This forms the basis of Meltzer and Richard￿ s (1981) celebrated result that the extent of
redistribution varies directly with the ratio of the mean to median income. Piketty (1995)
restricts preferences to the quasi-linear case with quadratic-disutility of labour. Benabou
(2000) considers the additively-separable case with log-consumption and disutility of labor
given by a constant-elasticity form. This brings us to our second contribution in the paper.
For the special case of sel￿sh voters, we establish the existence of a Condorcet winner for
a more general class of utility functions as compared to the existing literature.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 formulates the model. Section 3 establishes
the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have other regarding preferences. For the
special case of purely self interested preferences we establish the existence of a Condorcet
winner for a more general class of utility functions relative to the existing literature. Section
4 provides an illustration and checks that our assumptions are satis￿ed in the quasi-linear
case with constant elasticity of labour supply, which forms the basis of much research in
the literature.
2. Model
We consider a general equilibrium model as in Meltzer and Richard (1981). Let there be
n = 2m ￿ 1 voter-worker-consumers (henceforth, voters). Let the skill level of voter j be
sj, j = 1;2;:::;n, where
0 < si < sj < 1, for i < j, (2.1)
Denote the skill vector by s = (s1;s2;:::;sn) and the median skill level by sm. Each
voter has a ￿xed time endowment of one unit and supplies lj units of labor and so enjoys
Lj = 1 ￿ lj units of leisure, where
0 ￿ lj ￿ 1. (2.2)
Labour markets are competitive and each ￿rm has access to a linear production technology
such that production equals sjlj. Hence, the wage rate o⁄ered to each voter coincides with
the marginal product, i.e., the skill level, sj. Thus, the before-tax income of voter j is
3given by
yj = sjlj. (2.3)
Note that ￿ skill￿here need not represent any intrinsic talent, just ability to translate labour







The government operates a linear progressive income tax that is characterized by a
constant marginal tax rate, t, t 2 [0;1], and a uniform transfer, b, to each voter that
equals the average tax proceeds,
b = ty. (2.5)
The budget constraint of voter j is given by
0 ￿ cj ￿ (1 ￿ t)yj + b. (2.6)
In view of (2.3), the budget constraint (2.6) can be written as
0 ￿ cj ￿ (1 ￿ t)sjlj + b. (2.7)
2.1. Preferences of Voters
We de￿ne a voter￿ s preferences in two stages. First, let voter j have a concave own-
utility function, e u(cj;1￿lj), de￿ned over own-consumption, cj, and own-leisure, 1￿lj. In
common with the literature, we assume that all voters have the same own-utility function.
Hence, voters di⁄er only in that they are endowed with di⁄erent skill levels, sj. We assume
that the utility function has the following, plausible, properties. It is thrice continuously
di⁄erentiable and
(a) e u1 > 0, (b) l > 0 ) e u2(c;1 ￿ l) > 0, (c) e u2 (c;1) = 0, (d) e u1 (c;0) ￿ e u2 (c;0), (2.8)
(a) e u11 ￿ 0, (b) e u12 ￿ 0, (c) l > 0 ) e u22(c;1 ￿ l) < 0, (d) (e u12)
2 ￿ e u11e u22. (2.9)
From (2.8a), the marginal utility of consumption is positive, while (2.8b) implies that
marginal utility of leisure is positive, unless l = 0 in which case (2.8c) says that the
consumer is satiated with leisure. From (2.8d), when a consumer has no leisure, she
always (weakly) prefers one extra unit of leisure to one extra unit of consumption. (2.9a)
3For example, a highly talented classical musician may be able to earn only a modest income, while
a merely competent ￿ pop￿musician may earn millions. In our model, the former would be classi￿ed as
having a low s while the latter would be classi￿ed as having a high s. Similarly, in recent years, there
has been a record level of skilled (in the ordinary sense of the word) migration into Britain from Eastern
Europe. However, since they are predominantly accepting low pay work, they would be classi￿ed in our
model as having low s.
4says that marginal utility of consumption is non-increasing. Consumption and leisure
are complements (2.9b) while (2.9c) implies that the marginal utility of leisure is strictly
declining unless, possibly, the consumer is satiated with leisure (in which case e u22(c;1) =
0). Conditions (2.8) and (2.9a-c) guarantee that a maximum exists, that it is unique and
that it is an interior point (0 < li < 1); unless t = 1 in which case the maximum will lie
at li = 0. Conditions (2.9a,c,d) guarantee that e u is concave.
Since @e u
@cj > 0, (2.8a), it follows that the budget constraint (2.7) holds with equality.
Substituting cj = (1 ￿ t)sjlj + b, from (2.7), into the own-utility function, e u(cj;1 ￿ lj),
gives the following form for own-utility
uj = u(lj;t;b;sj) = e u((1 ￿ t)sjlj + b;1 ￿ lj). (2.10)
Second, and for the reasons stated in the introduction, voters have other-regarding
preferences as in Fehr-Schmidt (1999). Under Fehr-Schmidt preferences the FS-utility of
voter j, Uj (lj;l￿j;t;b;s), is as follows. Let l￿j be the vector of labour supplies of voters
other than voter j. Then










maxf0;uj ￿ uig, (2.11)
where uj is de￿ned in (2.10) and
for sel￿sh voters ￿ = ￿ = 0, so Uj (lj;l￿j;t;b;s) = u(lj;t;b;sj), (2.12)
for fair voters 0 < ￿ < 1; ￿ < ￿, so Uj (lj;l￿j;t;b;s) 6= u(lj;t;b;sj). (2.13)
Thus, u is also the utility function of a sel￿sh voter, as in the standard textbook
model. From (2.11), the fair voter cares about own-utility (￿rst term), utility relative
to those where inequality is disadvantageous (second term) and utility relative to those
where inequality is advantageous (third term). The second and third terms which cap-
ture respectively, envy and altruism, are normalized by the term n ￿ 1: Notice that in FS
preferences, inequality is self-centered, i.e., the individual uses her own utility as a refer-
ence point with which everyone else is compared. ￿ > 1 would imply that an individual
could increase utility by simply destroying all his/her wealth; this is counterfactual. The
restriction ￿ < ￿ is based on experimental evidence. These and related issues are more
fully discussed in Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
2.2. Sequence of moves
We consider a two-stage game. In the ￿rst stage, all voters vote directly and sincerely on
the redistributive tax rate. Should a median voter equilibrium exist, then the tax rate
preferred by the median voter is implemented. In the second stage, all voters make their
5labour supply decision, conditional on the tax rate chosen by the median voter in the ￿rst
stage. On choosing their labour supplies in the second stage, the announced ￿rst period
tax rate is implemented and transfers made according to (2.5).
In the second stage the voters play a one-shot Nash game: each voter, j, chooses
his/her labour supply, lj, given the vector, l￿j, of labour supplies of the other voters, so
as to maximize his/her FS-utility (2.11). In the ￿rst stage, each voter votes for his/her
preferred tax rate, correctly anticipating the second stage play.
The solution is by backward induction. We ￿rst solve for the Nash equilibrium in
labour supply decisions of voters conditional on the announced tax rates and transfers.
The second stage decision is then fed into the ￿rst stage FS-utilities to arrive at the
indirect utilities of voters, which are purely in terms of the tax rate. Voters then choose
their most desired tax rates which maximize their indirect FS-utilities, with the proposal
of the median voter being the one that is implemented.
2.3. Labour supply decision of taxpayers (second stage problem)
Given the tax rate, t, and the transfer, b, both determined in the ￿rst stage, the voters play
a one-shot Nash game (in the subgame determined by t and b). Each voter, j, chooses own
labour supply, lj, so as to maximize his/her FS-utility (2.11), given the labour supplies,
l￿j, of all other voters.
Proposition 1 : In the second stage of the game, voter j, whether fair or sel￿sh, chooses
own labour supply, lj, so as to maximize own-utility, u(lj;t;b;sj), given t, b and sj.
We list, in Lemmas 1 and 2 below, some useful results.
Lemma 1 (Properties of labour supply): (a) Given t;b and sj, there is a unique labour
supply for voter j, lj = l(t;b;sj), that maximizes own-utility u(lj;t;b;sj),
(b) t 2 [0;1) ) 0 < lj < 1,
(c) lj = 0 at t = 1,











(g) for each t 2 [0;1], the equation b = 1
nt￿n
i=1sil(t;b;si) has a unique solution b(t;s) ￿ 0;
and b(t;s) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable.
Substituting labour supply, given by Lemma 1(a), in u(lj;t;b;sj) we get the indirect
own-utility function of voter j:
vj = v (t;b;sj) = u(l(t;b;sj);t;b;sj). (2.14)














= 0, (cii) t 2 [0;1) )
@v(t;b;s)
@t < 0,
(d) t 2 [0;1) ) @2v
@s@b < 0.
Substituting labour supply, l(t;b;sj), into (2.3) gives before-tax income:
yj (t;b;sj) = sjl(t;b;sj). (2.15)
Substituting b(t;s), given by Lemma 1 (g), into the indirect own-utility (2.14), gives
wj (t;s) = v (t;b(t;s);sj). (2.16)
2.4. Existence of most desired tax rates (￿rst stage)
Substituting labour supply, l(t;b;sj), into the utility function, Uj (lj;l￿j;t;b;s), and using
(2.11) and (2.14), gives the indirect utility function, Vj (t;b;￿;￿;s), of voter j










maxf0;vj ￿ vig, (2.17)
where vj is de￿ned in (2.14).
In the light of Lemmas 2(bi) and 2(bii), (2.17) becomes

































Wj (t;￿;￿;s) = Vj (t;b(t;s);￿;￿;s); (2.20)
where b(t;s) is given by Lemma 1(g). Then (2.16), (2.18), (2.19) and (2.20) give










[wj ￿ wi], (2.21)





















Since e u(ci;1 ￿ li) is continuous by assumption, and since l(t;b;si) and b(t;s) are con-
tinuous, by Lemma 1(e) and (g), it follows, from (2.10), (2.14), (2.16) and (2.21) or (2.22),
that Wj (t;￿;￿;s) is a continuous function of t 2 [0;1]. Hence, Wj (t;￿;￿;s) attains a
maximum at some tj 2 [0;1]. This is the most desired tax tax rate for voter j. Thus, we
have established:
7Proposition 2 : In the ￿rst stage of the game, for each voter j, there exists a most
desired tax rate, tj 2 [0;1], that maximizes his/her indirect FS-utility, Wj (t;￿;￿;s), given
￿;￿;s.
The model with fair voters is similar in structure to the one with sel￿sh voters in that
a weighted social welfare function is maximized, where the weight placed by voter j on
















n￿1 > 0 if i = j
￿￿





Finding a tax rate to maximize (2.23) is a completely standard problem in public eco-
nomics.
3. Existence of a Condorcet winner
We shall show that a majority chooses the tax rate, tm, that is optimal for the median-skill
voter, in the sense that, for each j 6= m, a majority prefers tm over tj. We do this by using
the single-crossing property of Gans and Smart (1996).
De￿nition 1 : (Gans and Smart, 1996) The ￿ single-crossing￿property holds if for tax
rates t;T and voters j;J,
t < T, j < J, Wj (t;￿;￿;s) > Wj (T;￿;￿;s) ) WJ (t;￿;￿;s) > WJ (T;￿;￿;s).4





an increasing function of j (where Vj is de￿ned in (2.18)).
Lemma 4 : (Gans and Smart, 1996) If the ￿ single-crossing￿property holds, then the
median-voter is decisive, i.e., a majority chooses the tax rate that is optimal for the
median-voter.
The proofs of Lemmas 3, 4 can be found in Gans and Smart (1996).
4Here we use ￿<￿to denote the usual ordering of real numbers. In the more general setting of Gans
and Smart (1996), ￿<￿is used to denote several (possibly di⁄erent) abstract orderings. In particular,
a literal translation of Gants and Smart (1996) gives: T < t, j < J, Wj (t;￿;￿;s) > Wj (T;￿;￿;s) )
WJ (t;￿;￿;s) > WJ (T;￿;￿;s), where ￿j < J ￿has the usual meaning ￿j is less than J ￿but ￿T < t ￿
means ￿t is less than T ￿ .
83.1. Main results
We now introduce two further assumptions, A1 and A2, followed by the main result of the
paper.5
A1: t 2 [0;1) ) @2v
@s@t (t;b;s) < 0.
Recall, from Lemma 2(cii), that t 2 [0;1) ) @v







@s@t < 0 can
be interpreted as saying that an extra 1% on the redistributive tax rate hurts a poor person
less than a rich person. Thus Assumption A1 roughly says that redistributive taxes hurt
the poor less than the rich. This is the basic foundation of the modern welfare state, and
as we show below, satis￿ed in the important case of quasilinear preferences with constant
labor supply, which is widely used in the literature.
A2:
@Vj
@t (t;b;￿;￿;s) ￿ 0.
Since @v
@t < 0, for t < 1 (Lemma 2(cii)), an increase in tax (bene￿t, b, remaining ￿xed),
is undesirable for a sel￿sh-voter which is, of course, entirely reasonable. Assumption A2
extends this to fair-voters as well. It implies that envy/altruism is not so great as to make
a fair-voter prefer an increase in tax, even if it has no gain for any one at all in terms of
an increase in the bene￿ts, b ( b is held ￿xed in computing
@Vj
@t in A2).
Proposition 3 : Under assumptions A1 and A2 a majority prefers the tax rate that is
optimal for the median-skill voter.
Corollary 1 : Under assumption A1, if utility is quasi-linear, then a majority prefers the
tax rate that is optimal for the median-voter. In particular, assumption A2 is not needed
in this case.
Corollary 2 : Under assumption A1, if voters are sel￿sh (￿ = ￿ = 0), then a majority
prefers the tax rate that is optimal for the median-voter. Assumption A2 is satis￿ed in
this case.
As noted in the introduction, when labor supply is endogenous, the median-voter the-
orem with sel￿sh voters is known to hold only in special cases. Corollary 2 establishes the
existence of a Condorcet winner for a more general class of utility functions as compared
to the existing literature.
5Assumptions A1 and A2 are stated in terms of the indirect own-utility, v, and the indirect utility,
V . A1 and A2 can, of course, be rewritten in terms of the direct own-utility e u. However, the resulting
conditions on e u are extremely complex and di¢ cult to interpret. Moreover, by duality, neither direct
utility nor indirect utility can be regarded as more fundamental than the other.
94. An example: Quasi-linear preferences and constant elasticity of
labor supply
We assume that the own-utility function is quasi-linear, with constant elasticity of labour
supply, which is the most commonly used functional form in various applications of the
median voter theorems.






where ￿ is the constant elasticity of labour supply, and satis￿es6
0 < ￿ ￿ 1, (4.2)
The case ￿ = 1 has special signi￿cance in the literature. In this case,





Meltzer and Richard (1981) use (4.3) to derive the celebrated result that the extent of
redistribution varies directly with the ratio of the mean to median income. Piketty (1995)
restricts preferences to the quasi-linear case with disutility of labour given by the quadratic
form, (4.3).
It is straightforward to check that (4.1) satis￿es (2.8) and (2.9).
Substituting cj = (1 ￿ t)sjlj + b in (4.1), the own-utility function of voter j, we get







which corresponds to (2.10) above.
Lemma 1 gives labour supply for voter j,




Substituting labour supply, l(t;b;sj), given by (4.5), into (2.3), (2.5) and (4.4) gives,
respectively, before-tax income,














6A large number of studies suggest labour supply elasticities consistent with (4.2) (see, for example,
Pencavel (1986) and Killingworth and Heckman (1986)). Those that do not (for example, negative labour
supply elasticities) may be due to estimating misspeci￿ed models (see Camerer and Loewenstein (2004),
Chapter 1, ￿ Labor Economics￿ , pp33-34).
10and the indirect own-utility function of voter j:

















(t;b;s) = ￿(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ t)
￿ s
￿ < 0. (4.10)
From (4.10) we see that assumption A1 holds. From Corollary 1, assumption A2 is not
needed to demonstrate the existence of a Condorcet winner for the quasi-linear case. Hence,
it follows that a majority prefers the tax rate that is optimal for the median-voter. Thus,
our assumptions (2.8), (2.9), and A1 are satis￿ed by the example of quasi-linear preferences
and constant elasticity of labour supply. Hence, they are satis￿able in an important special
case.
5. Conclusions
We replace the self-interested voters in the Romer-Roberts-Meltzer-Richard (RRMR) frame-
work with voters who have a preference for fairness, as in Fehr-Schmidt (1999). We show
that a Condorcet exists under plausible conditions. We believe that our contribution can
open the way for further applications of behavioral concerns for fairness in political econ-
omy models. We also give a more general condition for the existence of a Condorcet winner
when voters have purely sel￿sh preferences.
116. Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider voter j. Let l￿j be the vector of labour supplies of all
other voters. Hence u(li;t;b;si);i 6= j; are ￿xed numbers. Since u(lj;t;b;sj) is continuous
in lj, and since maxf0;xg is continuous in x, it follows that Uj (lj;l￿j;t;b;s), as as given by
(2.11), is a continuous function of lj 2 [0;1]. Hence, Uj (lj;l￿j;t;b;s) attains a maximum
at some l￿
j 2 [0;1]. We shall argue that l￿
j must maximize own-utility, u(lj;t;b;sj). Let
Aj = fi : i 6= j and u(li;t;b;si) ￿ u(lj;t;b;sj)g,
Dj = fk : k 6= j and u(lk;t;b;sk) > u(lj;t;b;sj)g,
!ji =
￿
n￿1 > 0, for i 2 Aj,





!jk = ￿ ￿
n￿1 < 0, for k 2 Dj.
Then Uj (lj;l￿j;t;b;s) can be written as7




























j does not maximize own-utility u(lj;t;b;sj). Then we can ￿nd an l￿￿
j , su¢ ciently
close to l￿

















































Proof of Lemma 1: Given t;b and si, u(li;t;b;si) is a continuous function of li on the
non-empty compact set [0;1]. Hence, a maximum exists. Since e u is thrice di⁄erentiable,
so is u and, from (2.10), we get
@u
@li
= (1 ￿ t)sie u1 ((1 ￿ t)sili + b;1 ￿ li) ￿ e u2 ((1 ￿ t)sili + b;1 ￿ li), (6.1)
@2u
@b@li




= (1 ￿ t)
2 s
2
ie u11 ￿ 2(1 ￿ t)sie u12 + e u22. (6.3)
7Note that Aj and Dj, and hence also !ji, are functions of li, lj, si, sj, t and b, i = 1;2;:::;n,
j = 1;2;:::;n: !ji = !ji (li;lj;si;sj;t;b). The connection between !ji, de￿ned above, and ￿ji
de￿ned in (2.24), is as follows. In the light of Lemma 1 (a), (g) we can de￿ne ￿ji = ￿ji (t;s)
= !ji (li ((t;b(t;s);si));lj ((t;b(t;s);sj));si;sj;t;b(t;s)). In fact, ￿ji turn out to be functions of, i
and j only, as is obvious from (2.22), (2.23) and (2.24).




and from (2.9a), (2.9b), (2.9c) and (6.3) we get





First, consider the case t = 1. From (2.10), u(li;1;b;si) = e u(b;1 ￿ li). From (2.8b),
e u(b;1 ￿ li) is a strictly decreasing function of li on (0;1]. By continuity, e u(b;1 ￿ li) must
be a strictly decreasing function of li on [0;1]. Hence, the optimum must be
li = 0 at t = 1: (6.6)
Now suppose t 2 [0;1). From (2.1), (2.8a), (2.8c) and (6.1) we get:
@u
@li




(1;t;b;si) = (1 ￿ t)sie u1 ((1 ￿ t)si + b;0)￿e u2 ((1 ￿ t)si + b;0) < e u1 (0;0)￿e u2 (0;0) ￿ 0.
Hence, a maximum is an interior point, i.e.,
0 < li < 1. (6.7)
From (6.7) and (6.5) it follows that @2u
@l2




(li;t;b;si) = 0. (6.8)
Since, from (2.8c), e u2 (b;0) = 0, it follows, from (6.1) and (6.6), that (6.8) also holds
for t = 1. Hence, for any voter i, the labor supply,
li = l(t;b;si);t 2 [0;1], (6.9)
can be found by solving (6.8).
Since u is thrice continuously di⁄erentiable it follows, from (2.10) and (6.8) that
l(t;b;si) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable. If t = 1 then, from (6.6),
@li
@b = 0. Now
suppose t < 1. From (6.5), @2u
@l2
i < 0. Hence, from (6.4) and the implicit function theorem










￿ 0. Hence, for




13Let f (b) = 1
nt￿n
i=1sil(t;b;si). Since f (b) ￿ 0, f (b) is twice di⁄erentiable (hence
continuous) and f0 (b) ￿ 0 (from (6.10)), it follows that f (b) = b has a unique solution,
b(t;s) ￿ 0; and b(t;s) is twice continuously di⁄erentiable. ￿




























= ￿[sle u1 ((1 ￿ t)sl + b;1 ￿ l)]l=l(t;b;s) . (6.13)
Part (a) follows from (2.8a) and (6.11). Part (b) follows from (2.8a) and (6.12). Part (c)
follows from (2.8a), Lemma 1 (b) and (c), and (6.13).






e u11e u22 ￿ (e u12)
2￿
+ (1 ￿ t)e u1e u12 ￿ (1 ￿ t)
2 se u1e u11
(1 ￿ t)
2 s2e u11 ￿ 2(1 ￿ t)se u12 + e u22
< 0: (6.14)
From (2.8)a, (2.9) and (6.14), we get @2v
@b@s < 0 for t < 1. This establishes part (d). ￿





























































































































































is strictly increasing in j: (6.23)
From Lemma 3 and (6.23) we get that ￿ single-crossing￿holds. Hence, from Lemma 4,
the median-voter is decisive, i.e., a majority chooses the tax rate that is optimal for the
median-voter. This establishes Proposition 3. ￿
Proof of Corollary 1: Note that if u is quasi-linear, then u(c;1 ￿ l) = c ￿ f (l). Hence,




@b = 1. From this, and (6.17), we get that
@Vj























where the inequality in (6.24) comes from (6.16). Hence, (6.23) again holds, but we have
not used Assumption A2.
Proof of Corollary 2: If voters are sel￿sh, so that ￿ = ￿ = 0, then Assumption A2
reduces to @v
@t ￿ 0, which we know holds from Lemma 2(c). This establishes Corollary 2.
￿
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